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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium model with labour market frictions and
an imperfect nancial market. The aim of the paper is to analyse the transitional dynamics of
unemployment and vacancies when nancial constraints are in place. We model the nancial
sector as a monopolistically competitive banking sector that intermediates nancial capital
between rms. This structure implies a per period nancial resource constraint which has
a closed form solution and describes the transition path of unemployment and vacancies to
their steady state values. We show that the transition path crucially depends on the degree
of wage exibility. When wages do not depend on the unemployment rate the transition path
is always downward sloping. This implies unemployment and vacancies adjust in opposite
directions as observed in the data. When calibrating the model to the Great Recession and
its aftermath we nd that the lack of an improvement in the nancial sector's eectiveness
to intermediate resources played a crucial role in the slow recovery of the labour market.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession has highlighted the importance nancial markets can have on the per-
formance of the labour market. Most countries that were aected by the 2007/2008 nancial
crisis saw a burst of layos that made their unemployment rates increase dramatically and stay
stubbornly high during the recovery period. Since the nancial crisis particularly aected the
ability of rms to expand and create new vacancies due to the lack of available investment funds,
it has been argued that the credit crunch played an important role in slowing down the recovery
of unemployment. In this paper we investigate to what extent the adjustment of unemployment
and vacancies depends on the eectiveness of nancial markets to intermediate resources.
We construct a simple general equilibrium model with labour market frictions and an imper-
fect nancial market. Our focus is to analyse the transitional dynamics of unemployment and
vacancies in response to unexpected job displacement and nancial shocks. We are particularly
interested in assessing the eects of these shocks on unemployment and vacancies when nancial
constraints are in place.
Our framework extends the canonical search and matching model (as described in Pissarides,
2000) by adding a monopolistically competitive banking sector that rms must visit in order to
nance job creation. Once jobs are lled and rms become productive, they service their debts
over time until the job is exogenously destroyed. This simple structure implies that at any point
in time rms ow prots must be used to cover the cost of posting vacancies. The resulting
per period nancial resource constraint is the key element of our analysis. It shows that the
number of vacancies is positively related to rms' ow prots. Since in the search and matching
framework, the latter is directly related to the level of unemployment, the resource constraint
then describes the relation unemployment and vacancies must satisfy to guarantee equilibrium
in the banking sector.1 Furthermore, this constraint has a closed form solution and describes
the transition or saddle path of the economy towards its steady state.
These features allow us to characterise the out-of-steady-state dynamics of our model. In
particular, we are able to characterise how the out-of-steady-state dynamics of unemployment
and vacancies depend on unexpected changes to the variables of interest. A decrease in labour
productivity or in the productivity of the banking sector, for example, shifts the transition path
downwards and decreases the rate at which unemployment and vacancies adjustment towards
the new steady state. Changes in the rate at which employed workers become unemployed or
changes in the parameters governing the matching technology generate movements along the
transition path without aecting the rate at which unemployment and vacancies adjustment
towards the new steady state.
We show that the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies along the transition path cru-
cially depends on the degree to which labour market tightness and, in particular, the unemploy-
ment rate aects wages. When rms and workers Nash bargain over the expected match surplus
(as is traditionally assumed), wages depend on unemployment because agents' outside options
1Benmelech, Bergman and Seru (2012) document, using data for the US and Japan, a negative relation between
rms' cash ows and employment as well as a negative relation between the extent of credit availability to rms
and local unemployment rates.
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and disagreement payos equal their respective values of search. In this case unemployment
and vacancies adjust following a non-monotonic relationship. For low levels of unemployment
and vacancies, they both adjust in the same direction. For larger values they adjust in oppo-
site directions. The resource constraint implies that as unemployment increases the number
of productive rms decreases, reducing the available funds for job creation and generating a
negative relation between unemployment and vacancies. However, the non-monotonicity arises
due to the feedback eect of the job nding rate on wages and ultimately prots. An increase in
unemployment reduces workers' outside options and increases rms' ow prots, which in turn
implies there are more funds per productive rms to nance vacancies, generating a positive
relation between unemployment and vacancies. At low levels of unemployment and vacancies
the latter force dominates, while for larger values the former force dominates. As wages become
less dependent on the unemployment rate due to some form of wage rigidity, this feedback eect
diminishes.2 We show that when there is no interaction between unemployment and wages, such
as when rms and workers Nash bargain over the ow surplus (see Marcusee, 2016), one always
obtains a negative relation between unemployment and vacancies along the transition path.
Being able to generate such an adjustment process is important as a main feature of the
canonical search and matching model, as described in Pissarides (2000), is that unemployment
and vacancies always adjust in the same direction along the transition path. Blanchard and
Diamond (1989) document, however, that unemployment and vacancies adjust in opposite di-
rections after a shock to output or to the rate at which workers and rms separate. Furthermore,
Shimer (2005) and many others have shown that when the canonical search and matching model
is calibrated to the US, shocks to the job destruction rate generate a counterfactual positive cor-
relation between unemployment and vacancies. Given that we are able to solve for the transition
path in closed form, we provide an analytical characterisation of how unexpected changes to ag-
gregate output, the job destruction rate or to banking sector parameters aect the rate by which
unemployment and vacancies adjust between steady states.
In the quantitative section of the paper we analyse whether the out-of-steady-state dynamics
implied by our model can replicate the observed dynamics of the unemployment and vacancy
rate in the US economy for the period 2007-2014. Through the lenses of our model, we interpret
a sequence of observed unemployment and vacancy points as movements along a saddle path
towards a new steady state. We rst calibrate the model to match the transition of the unem-
ployment and vacancy rates from the beginning to the end of the Great Recession. We then
explore changes in vacancy costs, the rate of job destruction and in the parameters governing
the nancial sector that can account for the observed unemployment and vacancy dynamics dur-
ing the recovery period. We nd that the calibration favours wages that are isolated from the
unemployment rate. This property delivers a downward sloping transition path that replicates
the observed sequence of unemployment and vacancy points very well. The main message of
this exercise is that the observed slow recovery in the labour market was due to the lack of a
2In the sequential bargaining protocol proposed by Hall and Milgrom (2008), for example, outside options
are still described by the agents' values of search but are no longer equal to their disagreement payos. In this
case, unemployment aects wages through the risk of negotiation breakdown, which in Hall and Milgroms' (2008)
calibration, drastically reduces the eects of unemployment on wages.
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signicant improvement in the eectiveness of the banking sector in intermediating resources to
fund job creation.
Our approach to model the banking sector using a monopolistic competitive structure is
consistent with the evidence presented by Bikker and Haaf (2002). These authors evaluate the
degree of competition and concentration of the banking sector in 23 OECD countries, including
the US, for the period 1988 to 1998. They nd that across all these countries the banking sector
can be best characterised by monopolistic competition. Kadir et al. (2015) show that our ap-
proach to model the banking sector is also in accordance with the vast majority of studies that
evaluate the degree of competition and concentration of the banking sector across developed
and developing economies.3 Gerali et al. (2010) and La Croce and Rossi (2015) followed this
approach and embed a monopolistic competitive banking sector into a dynamic general equi-
librium framework. They, however, assume a perfectly competitive labour market and hence
cannot explore the interaction between imperfect competition in the banking sector and search
frictions in the labour market.
Recently a large body of work has appeared which studies the interaction between nancial
and labour market frictions. To be best of our knowledge, none of these studies formulates the
banking sector using a monopolisticaly competitive market structure. For example, Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), Chugh (2013) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), among many others, assume
a competitive nancial market where frictions arise due to costly state verication. In this
environment, the current (idiosyncratic) state of the rm (the borrower) is private information
to the rm, but the lender can learn it by paying a verication cost. Firms and lenders sign
one-period debt contracts that specify the size of the loan and a liquidation threshold. Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), Garin (2015) and Buera et al. (2015), among others, use a somewhat
related approach and assume frictions arise because the ability of rms to borrow is limited by
an enforcement constraint which is subject to random shocks. Wasmer and Weil (2004) and
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) propose an alternative approach and model the nancial
market as a frictional market govern by a meeting function that brings together lenders and
vacant rms, taking the interest rate as given.
Most of the aforementioned papers also develop their theories in the context of a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium environment or in the context of a stochastic version of the search
and matching model (see Andolfatto, 1996, and Shimer, 2005, among others). Instead we propose
a model without aggregate uncertainty (as in Pissarides, 2000). In our model the evolution of
unemployment and vacancies is studied after an unexpected shock to aggregate variables using
the out-of-steady-state dynamics implied by our model, characterised by the transition path
between steady states. In reality the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies are probably
driven by a combination of a sequence of random shocks and movements along a transition path
that shifts when these shocks get realised. Our parsimonious approach allows us to solve and
explore the model's mechanism analytically. We emphasize the resource constraint, imposed by
the nancial sector, as an important determinant of the relationship between unemployment
3Kadir et al. (2015, Table 1) present an extensive list of studies that nd that across developed and developing
countries the banking sector can be characterised by monopolistic competition.
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and vacancies in an economy's adjustment process.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In the next section we present the search
and matching model that describes the aggregate labour market and the monopolistically com-
petitive banking model that describes the nancial sector. In Section 3 we characterise the
equilibrium and discuss the steady state and out-of-steady-state dynamics. Here we analyse the
main implications of the nancial resource constraint on the transition path of vacancies and
unemployment and show how parameters governing the nancial market aect this transition
path. Section 4 presents the calibration procedure and describes its main results. Section 5
concludes discussing briey the main results of the paper. All proofs and tedious derivations
are relegated to a technical Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic framework
The labour market setup follows Pissarides (2000, ch.1). Since our objective is to understand
the transitional dynamics of the economy we consider out-of-steady-state analysis. Time is
continuous with innite horizon. There is a unit mass of workers and a mass of rms. Both
agents discount the future at a potentially time-dependent interest rate r(t). Workers can be
either employed or unemployed. Unemployed workers receive constant benets z per unit of
time. An employed worker receives a wage rate of w(t) per unit of time. Each rm has only one
job that can be either vacant or lled. A lled job generates a constant ow of output p > z.
A rm with a vacant job pays a cost measured in terms of productivity units of k > 0 per unit
of time. Jobs are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson rate s > 0. Once destroyed, the rm's job
becomes vacant and the worker becomes unemployed.
Agents must search for each other to nd a match. The search process is sequential and ran-
dom and we assume that only vacancies and unemployed workers search. Meetings are governed
by a meeting or \matching function" m (u (t) ; v (t)) which gives the number of meetings that
take place per unit time as a function of the number of unemployed workers u (t) and the number
of vacancies v (t). Assume that m (:) is increasing and concave in both arguments and exhibits
constant returns to scale. Let  (t)  v (t) =u (t) denote the labour market tightness. Constant
returns to scale then imply that the job lling rate is given by q((t))  m (u(t); v(t)) =v(t), while
the job nding rate is then  ((t)) = (t)q ((t)). These rates govern the Poisson processes by
which agents meet in this labour market.
2.2 Bellman equations for workers and rms
Workers and rms are risk neutral. The workers' objective is to maximise the expected present
value of their lifetime income E0
R1
0 e
  R s0 r(s)dsy(t)dt with ow income y(t) = fz; w(t)g. Let
U denote the expected value of an unemployed worker and let W denote the expected value
of a worker employed at some net wage w. Dynamic programming arguments imply that the
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following U and W satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
r(t)U (t) = z + _U (t) +  ((t)) [W (t)  U (t)]; (1)
r(t)W (t) = w(t) + _W (t) + s [U (t) W (t)] : (2)
The rm's ow prot from a lled job is
(t) = p  w (t) : (3)
An unlled job yields a ow prot of  k with k > 0. Firms are innitely lived and their
objective is to maximise the expected present value of total prots E0
R1
0 e
  R s0 r(s)ds$(t)dt with
ow prots $(t) = f k; (t)g. Let V denote the expected value of holding a job vacant. Let J
denote the expected value of a lled job paying w. We then obtain the corresponding Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations by dynamic programming arguments,
r (t)V (t) =  k + _V (t) + q ((t)) [J(t)  V (t)] ; (4)
r (t) J (t) = (t) + _J (t) + s [V (t)  J (t)] : (5)
The interpretation of the above equations is identical to the canonical search and matching
model model only that discounting takes place at an endogenous interest rate r (t).
2.3 Free entry and wage determination
For a given tightness and wage rate, the number of vacancies is determined by a free entry
condition. As long as the value V of opening a vacancy is positive, rms will create vacancies
and enter the labour market. Firms will stop entering only when there are no more (inter-
temporal) prots to be made; i.e. V = 0. Using the Bellman equation (4), we obtain that
J (t) =
k
q ( (t))
: (6)
When an unemployed worker and a vacant rm meet, p > z insures that they immediately
form a productive match. It has been standard to use the generalised Nash bargaining solution
as a way to determine wages. In this case, it is typically assumed that the worker's and rm's
outside options and disagreement payos are the same and given by U (t) and V (t), respectively.
This protocol implies agents receive a constant fraction of the expected match surplus and yields
a fully exible wage that is a linear function of p, z and . On the other extreme, Hall (2005)
proposed an alternative wage determination mechanism motivated by his observation that wages
do not seem to behave as spot wages in the data. He uses a Nash demand game in which wages
are xed within the bargaining set. In this setup, wages are not renegotiated until they lie
outside the bargaining set and hence prevent inecient separations.
Other wage determination mechanisms that lie somewhere in between the above two cases
have also been studied in the literature. In particular, the sequential bargaining protocol pro-
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posed by Hall and Milgrom (2008) generates a form of wage rigidity by partially isolating wages
from the inuence of . The crucial aspect of their bargaining protocol is that agents' disagree-
ment payos are no longer equal to agents' outside options, U (t) and V (t). The disagreement
payos are independent of  and agents' receive their outside options only when negotiations
break down, which happens with some probability every period.4
In this paper we follow an agnostic approach to wage determination and use the following
relation:
w(t) = (1  ) z +  [p+ (t)k] : (7)
In this wage equation  is the worker's exogenous bargaining power standard in the Nash
bargaining protocol. The crucial parameter, however, is  2 [0; 1] which determines the extend
to which  aects wages. When  = 1, for example, we are back to the well known Nash
bargaining solution of the canonical search and matching framework. When  2 (0; 1) we have
an outcome that partially isolates the wage from the inuences of labour market tightness. This
case captures, in reduced form, the spirit of Hall and Milgrom's (2008) wage determination
protocol. When  = 0 the outcome is the same as the one obtained when workers and rms
Nash bargain over the ow surplus, p z. In this case, wages are fully isolated from the inuence
of labour market tightness.5
The main reason for the choice of the functional form presented in equation (7) is that
we are interested in understanding the role wage rigidity plays in the interaction between the
nancial and labour markets. Equation (7) presents a specication that allows us to do this in
a simple and tractable way. In the quantitative section we recover  and  from our calibration
procedure.
2.4 Equilibrium without a nancial sector
Given a time-dependent interest rate, equilibrium can then be described by the evolution of
the unemployment rate _u(t) and the evolution of labour market tightness _(t). Inows to
unemployment amount to s [1  u (t)] ; while  ((t))u (t) unemployed individuals nd a job at
each instant. For a path of labour market tightness, the unemployment rate u(t) in this economy
evolves over time according to
_u(t) = s [1  u (t)]   ( (t))u (t) : (8)
The evolution of labour market tightness can be determined by the value of a lled vacancy
(6) and by an equation describing its evolution over time. After some steps (see app. A.1), we
4See also the staggered wage setting protocol proposed by Gertler and Trigari (2006) as another example of a
wage determination protocol that delivers wage rigidity.
5Marcusse (2016) argues that Nash bargaining over the ow surplus can be thought of as a similar bargaining
protocol as that of Hall and Milgroms' (2008) under the conditions that oers arrive instantaneously and there
is no risk of negotiation breakdown during bargaining. Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) also argue that one can
obtain the wage equation w = z+0:5(p  z) as the solution to a symmetric sequential bargaining game under the
assumption that a worker obtains ow utility z and the rm a zero ow payo while bargaining continues and
that agents negotiate over p.
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obtain a dierential equation describing the evolution of labour market tightness
_(t) =

q((t))
q0((t))
 
(1  )
k
(p  z) q((t))  r(t)  s  ((t))

: (9)
Equations (8) and (9) determine the paths of u(t) and  (t) as a function of r (t).
2.5 The nancial sector
We now close our matching model by including a nancial sector. We consider a banking sector
that is the only source for nancing the vacancy costs and to which all prots of productive
rms ow. In this environment, a potential market entrant that wants to nance a vacancy
must visit a bank and ask for a ow of resources allowing to cover the vacancy costs k to be paid
at each point in time until a worker is found. In order to get these resources, the rm needs to
sign a contract that says that the entrant commits to repay the bank by the ow of prots it
makes once the vacancy is lled and until the next separation takes place. The bank bears all
the risk and diversies across all entrants and productive rms such that the bank behaves as if
the world was deterministic.
Suppose that the banking sector consists of n(t) dierent types of banks oering each one
single banking service i at any time t. Banks operate under monopolistic competition. Financial
services are aggregated to one big \nancing package for opening a vacancy" by a technology of
the Dixit-Stiglitz type
Y (t) =
"Z n(t)
0
x (i; t) di
#1=
; (10)
where x (i; t) is the amount of services provided by bank i at time t and  2 (0; 1) determines the
degree of substitution between nancial services. The elasticity of substitution between nancial
services is then given by (1  ) 1.
Banking service i is produced by the technology
x (i; t) = by (i; t)  ; (11)
where b is a productivity parameter, y (i; t) is the input of the nal good produced and consumed
in this economy and  describes the xed costs to be paid by monopolistic competitors. Just as
with vacancy costs, xed costs in the banking sector are measured in units of the output good.
Service providers maximise prots by choosing output x (i; t) optimally at each point in time.
As all rms use the same technology, service provision will be symmetric and the usual steps
(see app. A.2.1) imply aggregate output of the banking sector (10) amounts to
Y (t) = n (t)1= x (t) = n (t)1=

b
(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  

: (12)
A crucial assumption here is that we require that all resources available for nancing va-
cancies must actually be used for nancing vacancies. Resources must not be lost or allowed
to enter the model. Making such a market-clearing assumption for the banking sector implies
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that the aggregate banking output (12) equals the total cost of nancing vacancies. The latter
is given by the cost k per vacancy times the number of vacancies, (t)u(t), such that
n (t)1=

b
(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  

= k (t)u (t) : (13)
Economically speaking, market clearing for nancial services (13) determines the number of
vacancies v (t). Technically, as vacancies are already determined in (9), this additional market
xes the endogenous interest rate r (t).
While the resource constraint described in (13) makes sure that resources used for nancing
vacancies can only come from prots made by rms, it does not guarantee that there are no
resources left unused. As monopolistic service providers make a prot, this prot needs to go
somewhere. It can actually not be ruled out at this point that rms would even make negative
prots, given that there are xed costs  to be paid per period. To guarantee that all resources
supplied by rms making a prot are used either for covering xed costs for the provision of
services or for nancing vacancies, we apply the standard assumption here as well and assume
that there is free entry into and exit from the banking sector. This implies (see app. A.2.1) that
the number of services is given by
n (t) = (1  ) b(t) [1  u(t)]

: (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) and some algebra (see app. A.2.1) establishes that
 (t)
(1  ) p zk    (t)
= b

(1  ) k

1  1  u(t)
u (t)
 : (15)
Equation (15) describes the resource constraint that is consistent with free entry in the banking
sector. Under this specication, all prots made by rms are used for nancing vacancies and
all costs of vacancies are nanced by rms' prots. Prots made by banks are used to pay their
xed costs. This makes sure that the nancial market is in equilibrium, no resources leave or
enter the model and we have specied a general equilibrium matching model.
3 General Equilibrium
Equations (8) and (9) provide the basis to understand the goods and labour markets dynamics
by describing _u and _. Equation (15) describes equilibrium in the nancial market. These three
equations simultaneously solve for u(t), (t) and r(t). Before we describe the out-of-steady-state
dynamics of this system, we analyse its steady state.
3.1 Zero-motion lines and steady state
From equation (8) we obtain that the zero-motion line for u is given by
 () = s
1  u
u
, u = s
s+  ()
; (16)
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which describes a negative relationship between u and . The zero-motion line for  is implicitly
given, from (9), by
(1  ) p  z
k
q()  s  r (t)  () = 0: (17)
What is special about this zero-motion line is that the interest rate is a function of time which
means that the zero-motion line shifts in the (u  ) space. What is standard is that the zero-
motion line for  is not a function of u, i.e. it is horizontal in the (u  ) space.
In standard descriptions of phase diagrams, the equilibrium path is to be inferred from the
zero-motion lines and laws of motions subsequently. In our system, however, the equilibrium
path towards the steady state is described in closed-form by (15). Using the latter equation
it is easy to verify that  falls with u: The right-hand side unambiguously falls in u while the
left-hand side rises in . Our general equilibrium matching model therefore provides an explicit
expression for the transition path in terms of unemployment and vacancies, which we discuss
below.
In a steady state, the unemployment rate, labour market tightness and the interest rate are
constant. Denote their steady state values as u,  and r. To show the existence of a steady
state note from (16) that as u goes to zero,  grows unboundedly; and while as u goes to one, 
goes to zero. From (15), however, we have that as u goes to zero,  goes to (1  )(p  z)=k;
while as u goes to one,  goes to zero. Hence these functions intersect at u = 1 and  = 0.
Further, since these functions are continuous and decrease monotonically, they can intersect at
most once at some u 2 (0; 1) and  2 (0;1). Given the steady state values of u and , the
interest rate r then adjusts such that (17) holds. Since in the case in which u = 1 and  = 0 (17)
implies r is undetermined, in what follows we focus on characterising the transition dynamics
towards the interior steady state, (u; ; r), given that one exists.
In app. A.3 we provide a sucient condition under which a unique interior steady state exists
for any CRS matching function. Further, we show that under a Cobb-Douglas matching function
M(u; v) = Auv1 , the parametric restriction  +   1 is sucient (but not necessary) to
guarantee existence of an interior steady state equilibrium. In the quantitative section of the
paper we show that a unique interior steady state always exists in our calibration.
3.2 Transitional dynamics
An insightful way to analyse the transition path described in (15) is to consider it in Beveridge
space; i.e. v   u space. It is well documented that unemployment and vacancies move in
opposite directions. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and, more recently, Shimer (2005) and
Sniekers (2016) show that unemployment and vacancies move in opposite directions during the
adjustment process of the US economy; and similar results have been obtained for European
countries (see Elsby et al., 2013). It is of interest to understand the conditions under which the
interaction between the labour market and the nancial sector, as modelled in this paper, has
the potential to generate such a negative relation.
Re-writing equation (15) in v u space, we obtain that the sign of the slope of the transition
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path is determined by (see app. A.4)
sign

dv
du

= sign

@
@u
(1  u)  

:
To understand this condition, note that equation (13) implies that aggregate rm prots and
the number of vacancies must move in the same direction along the equilibrium path. Aggregate
rms' prots, however, depend positively on (i) the number of jobs lled and negatively on (ii)
the wage paid to workers; and both are inversely related to the unemployment rate. The slope of
the transition path then depends on how responsive are wages to changes in the unemployment
rate.
Using the expression for @=@u, we nd that
dv
du
< 0,  <   u
2(1  )(p  z)
kv
; (18)
where  describes the threshold value of our wage rigidity parameter such that when  < 
the transition path is downward sloping and when  >  the transition path is upward sloping.
Note that for values of  2 (0; 1], the transition path is typically non-monotonic as  changes
with u and v satisfying (15).6 When  = 0, however, this non-monotonicity disappears. In this
case the feedback eect between unemployment and prots disappears, @=@u = 0, and the
transition path is downward sloping for all values of u and v.
This feature incorporates an important dimension to the canonical search and matching
model. In the latter, with a constant interest rate, the transition path towards the steady state
is given by the zero-motion line for  for any value of  . This implies that during adjustment,
vacancies and unemployment move in the same direction irrespectively of the degree of wage
rigidity as modelled in (7). Here the above arguments imply that during adjustment vacancies
and unemployment can move in opposite directions.
3.3 Changes in output and the job destruction rate
To illustrate this dierence consider a one time unexpected increase in aggregate productivity
p. Figure 1.a depicts this exercise in v   u space assuming the existence of an interior steady
state and a range of values for v and u within which the transition path is downward sloping. In
this section we want to show the qualitative workings of the model under the latter conditions.
In Section 4.3 we explore quantitatively how much insulation from  is required to obtain a
downward sloping transition path on the relevant range of values for v and u.
An increase in p generates in both models an upward rotation of the zero-motion line for .
In our model, in addition, the resource constraint shifts outwards. In the gure, the new curves
are depicted as dashed curves. The increase in p makes labour market tightness jump upwards
as rms create new vacancies up to the point in which the economy is on the new transition path
at the original unemployment rate. In our model the initial jump of vacancies (shown by the
6In all our numerical simulations we nd that in this case the transitions path rst increases and then decreases
as we increase u.
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Figure 1: Transitional dynamics after a one time unexpected shock to p and s
solid arrowed line from v to v0) is smaller than in the canonical search and matching model as
our transition path lies below the zero-motion line for , over the relevant range. Further, along
this path the unemployment rate decreases, while the vacancy rate increases. These transitional
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dynamics then yield counter-clockwise movements of u and v and a new steady state that is
characterised by a higher vacancy rate and a lower unemployment rate. These features are
consistent with the evidence in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), who show that the counter-
clockwise movements of u and v around the zero-motion line for u after a productivity shock
involve these rates moving in opposite directions.
As a second example consider a one time unexpected increase in the job destruction rate, s.
Figure 1.b shows this exercise. Here the dierence between the two models is starker. After an
increase in s, both models imply that the zero-motion line for u shifts to the right, while the
zero-motion line for  rotates downwards (in v   u space). Once again, in the gure, these are
depicted by the dashed curves. In the canonical model, however, v jumps downwards, while u
stays constant immediately after impact. As the economy adjusts, both variables then increase
along the new zero-motion line for  until the new steady state is achieved. In our model, the
transition path does not depend on s (see (15)), which implies that v does not jump. Instead
v decreases and u increases smoothly along the transition path until the new steady state is
achieved. Furthermore, an increase in the job destruction rate will always imply a new steady
state with a lower vacancy rate and a higher unemployment rate, while in the canonical model
the new steady state can be characterised by a higher vacancy and unemployment rates. These
features are also consistent with the evidence presented in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and
Shimer (2005) on the eects of reallocations shocks on v and u.
Note also that in our model changes in the matching function parameters will have similar
eects as changes in the job destruction rate, although in the opposite direction. For example,
consider a Cobb-Douglas matching function, M(u; v) = Auv1 . Changes in A and  will shift
the zero-motion line for unemployment along the transition path of the economy, generating
dierent dynamics relative to the canonical model.
In addition since in our model changes in p aect both the position and the slope of the
transition path, output aects the rate at which unemployment and vacancies adjust from one
steady state to another. On the contrary, since the job destruction rate and the matching
function parameters do not determine the transition path, the rate at which unemployment and
vacancies adjustment along the transition path to the new steady state is independent of these
variables.
3.4 Changes in the nancial sector
We now consider how the market power of banks, measured by the price mark-up, 1=, the
productivity of each bank, b, and the xed cost, , aect the transitional dynamics of this
economy and the steady state equilibrium. For this purpose, re-write (15) in implicit form as
	(; u)  u  
(1  )

k

b(1  )[(1  )(p  z)  k][1  u]

 1

= 0: (19)
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Note that its slope is given by
d
du
=   n[(1  )k(1  u) + n
1
 ]
k(1  )(1  u)[nu+ n 1 (1  u)b]
< 0; (20)
and recall that when u = 0,  = (1   )(p   z)=k and that when u = 1,  = 0. Therefore,
since the intersections of 	 with the axis are independent of ,  or b, to analyse the impact of
these variables on the transition path it is sucient to analyse their impact on (20).
First consider an increase in the banks' xed cost. Dierentiation of (20) with respect to
 implies that the transition path experiences a leftward expansion and becomes atter for all
values of u when (1   )(p   z)u > k. Note that this is the same condition required to
guarantee a downward sloping transition path in Beveridge space. Since the zero-motion line for
unemployment is independent of , in those cases in which the latter condition is satised, the
new steady state unemployment rate increases, while labour market tightness decreases which,
by virtue of (17), implies that the interest rate increases. Because the transition path becomes
atter, the rate at which unemployment and vacancies arrive to the new steady state decreases.
Now consider an increase in bank's productivity. Dierentiation of (20) with respect to b
implies that the transition path experiences a rightward expansion and becomes steeper for all
values of u when (p   z)(1   )u > k. In these cases and given that the zero-motion line
for unemployment is independent of b, the new steady state is characterised by a lower level of
unemployment, a higher labour market tightness and, by virtue of (17), a lower interest rate.
Furthermore, the rate at which unemployment and vacancies arrive to the new steady state
increases.
Finally consider an increase in , such that the elasticity of substitution between nancial
products increases and banks' mark-ups decrease. In this case dierentiation of (20) shows that
there is an ambiguous impact of  on the slope of the transition path. In app. A.5 we show
conditions under which an increase in  has the same eects as an increase in b, at least for the
cases in which  ! 1 and  ! 0. We will turn to these comparative statics in more detail in
the next section, where we quantitatively evaluate the model.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The objective of this section is to analyse whether the transition path implied by our model can
replicate the dynamics of the unemployment and vacancy rates in the US economy for the period
2007-2014. To do so, we consider two sub-periods: (i) The Great Recession (November 2007 {
August 2009) and (ii) the Recovery (September 2009 { December 2014). Through the lenses
of our model, we interpret a sequence of (u; v) points within a given sub-period as movements
along the transition path towards a new steady state. This section proceeds by calibrating the
model to match the unemployment and vacancy dynamics during the Great Recession. That
is, we calibrate the model to match the transition from the beginning of the Great Recession
period to the end of the Great Recession. We then explore changes in vacancy costs and changes
in the nancial sector that can account for the observed unemployment and vacancy dynamics
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during the recovery period.
4.1 Parametrisation
The length of a period in the model is set to one month. We use information on the number
of vacancies from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) and seasonally ad-
justed monthly series on the stock of employed, unemployed and short-term unemployed workers
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.7 From these series we construct monthly series of
job-nding-, unemployment- and vacancy rates (see Figures 5 to 7 in app. A.7).8
We use a Cobb-Douglas specication for the matching function,M(ut; vt) = Au

t v
1 
t , which
implies a job nding rate of (t) = A
1 
t . The parameters A and  are then obtained from
regressing the (log) job nding rates on a constant and (log) labour market tightness using data
for the pre-crisis period December 2000 { October 2007. Given our estimates of A and , we
set the job destruction rate such that we match the steady-state unemployment rate u at the
end of the Great Recession, i.e. s = u
()
1 u . Furthermore we set the interest rate r
 = 0:0027
such that it corresponds to the (annual) bank prime loan rate of 3.25% at end of the Great
Recession.9
After normalising the productivity parameters to unity, p = b = 1, we are then left with
x = fk; z; ; ; ; g parameters to recover. For this we exploit the variation in the observed
values of u and v during the Great Recession. In particular, we minimise the squared relative
distance between the observed vacancy rates and the ones implied by our transition path taking
the observed unemployment rates as given. That is, we choose
x = argmin
X
t

vt   v^(x;ut)
vt
2
subject to (17) and v = v^(x;u); (21)
where v^(x;ut) denotes the vacancy rate that solves (15) given the vector of parameters x and
the observed unemployment rate ut. The rst restriction is given by the zero-motion line for ,
while the second restriction requires that the transition path must go through the steady state
(u,v) at the end of the Great Recession. In addition, we impose two further restrictions to
pin down x. First, we interpret z to represent unemployment benets and set the replacement
ratio to one half. Second, we follow Silva and Toledo (2007) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2013) and require that the total vacancy cost amount to 3.6% of the wage rate. In app. A.6
we present further details on the implementation of the optimisation problem.
Table 1 shows the parameter values obtained from our calibration procedure as well as the
steady state targets. Note that the elasticity of the matching function is close to Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005). Also note that to generate a suciently downward sloping resource constraint,
7We use the BLS series LNS13000000, LNS13008396 and LNS12000000.
8Let Ut denote the number of unemployed in month t, and let U
s
t+1 correspond to the number of short-term
unemployed with unemployment durations of less than 5 weeks in month t+ 1. Following standard practice in
the literature, the job-nding rate in month t is then given by U2Et = 1 - (Ut+1 - U
s
t+1)/Ut. Similarly, the
job-destruction rate in month t is given by E2Ut = U
s
t+1/Et, where Et denotes the number of employed workers
in month t (see Figure 6 in app. A.7).
9The data on bank prime loan rates are taken from the online data base of the Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis:
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Labour Market Parameters Financial Sector Parameters Steady state (8/2009)
Matching eciency A 0.430 Fixed costs nancial sector  0.028 u 0.096
Elasticity of matching function  0.709 Elasticity of substitution 11  1.097 
 0.155
Vacancy cost k 2.320 Banks' productivity b 1.000 r 0.0027
Worker's bargaining weight  0.919 s 0.027
Wage rigidity  9.12e-8 () 0.250
Unemployment benets z 0.479
Labour productivity p 1.000
the calibration procedure yields a value of  very close to zero. In Section 4.3, below, we discuss
this result further. Further, since the calibration gives workers a high bargaining power, the
implied wage equals to 0.96 similar to the one obtained by Hall (2005). Although the value of
k seems high, this value is calculated as vk = 0:036w = 0:0346 and hence the low vacancy
rate observed in August 2009 (v = 0:015) implies a k = 2:32. Also note that the value of the
elasticity of substitution between nancial services, 1=(1  ) = 1:097, implies that the banking
sector in our calibration is far from competitive and enables banks to command high monopoly
rents.
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Figure 2: Unemployment and vacancy dynamics
Figure 2 shows the model implications for the observed unemployment and vacancy dynam-
ics during the Great Recession. The dots depict the unemployment and vacancy rate pairs
observed during this period, which moved from low unemployment-high vacancy rates to high
unemployment-low vacancy rates. In November 2007, immediately before the crisis, the US
economy experienced an unemployment rate of 4.7% and a labor market tightness of 0.59. We
assume that this was the steady state of the economy before the Great Recession with a job
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destruction rate of 0.018 that is consistent with the observed unemployment rate at that time.
As discussed by Elsby and Smith (2010), the Great Recession in the US was characterised by a
sharp increase in the job destruction rate. In our model the increase in s shifts the zero-motion
line of unemployment such that the post-crisis steady state implies a higher unemployment
level. As one can observe from Figure 2, v decreased and u increased sharply during the Great
Recession and our saddle-path tracks these movements closely. Given the unexpected nature
of the nancial crisis (see Caballero and Kurlat, 2009), Figure 2 can then be interpreted as
the empirical counterpart to Figure 1.b shown in Section 3.3 when discussing the eects of an
unexpected shock in s.
4.2 The recovery
During the period September 2009 { December 2014 the economy underwent a slow recovery,
where the unemployment and vacancy rates slowly reverted to their pre-recession levels (see
Figure 7 in app. A.7). We now analyse what change in the parameters p; k; ; b are required
to match the observed transition to the new steady state during the recovery.10 This exercise
informs us whether the model requires drastic changes to the parameters governing the nancial
sector to explain the transitional dynamics of unemployment and vacancies in the aftermath
of the Great Recession. This exercise also informs us about the magnitude of the change the
model requires in output per worker and vacancy costs to fuel rm entry and converge to the
new steady state.
For this exercise we take the new steady state to be December 2014 (the end period of
our window of observation). This steady state is characterised by u = 0:058,  = 0:54 and
r = 0:0027. Since by December 2014 the job destruction rate decreased relative to August 2009
(see Figure 6 in app. A.7), the zero-motion line for the unemployment rate shifted to the left. As
before, we set the job destruction rate such that we match the steady-state unemployment rate
u, i.e. s = u
()
1 u = 0:22. We then calibrate fp; k; ; bg by solving the optimisation problem
in (21) using data on vacancies and unemployment during the Recovery. All other parameters
are held xed. As before we require that the transition path goes through the steady state
(u; v).
Figure 3 shows the model's implications for the observed unemployment and vacancy dy-
namics during the Recovery under this exercise. Relative to the Great Recession, the model's
transition path shifted to the right with a slight upward rotation. However, note that the tran-
sition path during the Recovery period is still relatively at, implying that the unemployment
and vacancy rates converge slowly to the new steady state. The new values for the calibrated
parameters are p = 0:98, k = 1:08, b = 0:97 and  = 0:078, where the latter implies an elasticity
of substitution between nancial products of 1:085.
The rst implication of this exercise is that, from the lenses of our model, the observed
10We keep the banks' xed cost of entry, , constant in this exercise, as a joint minimisation with respect to
b and  exhibits many local minima. Further, holding  constant is consistent with the evolution of the ratio
between banks operational expenses and the employment in the nancial sector as obtained from the OECD
Banking Statistics: Financial Statements of Banks. This series shows basically no change during the period
2007-2014.
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Figure 3: Unemployment and vacancy dynamics
recovery in the labour market during the 2010-2014 period was not due to improvements in the
eectiveness of banks to intermediate nancial resources, b, or due to an increase in the degree
of competition among banks . When compared to the values in Table 1, the value of these
parameters hardly changed. Indeed, b only dropped by 3 percentage points and the elasticity of
substitution dropped by about one percentage point. Compared to the Great Recession period
the number of banks in the nancial sector decreased from nGR = 1:25 to nR = 1:23 and the
aggregate output of banks remained unchanged YGR = YR = 0:034. This implication seems to
have some support in the data. For example, Figure 8 in the app. A.7 shows that the money
multiplier, a measure related to the productivity of banks, had a large drop during 2008 and
then stayed essentially at through the rest of the period.
The second implication of this exercise is that convergence to the new steady state was
propelled by a lower vacancy cost and job destruction rate, which led to an increase in rm
entry.11 However, as opposed to the canonical search and matching model rm entry is not a
jump variable. In our model job creation needs to be nanced by the prot of existing rms
using the banking sector to intermediate the nancial resources. Given that the eectiveness of
the banking sector to undertake such a task hardly changed during this period, the increase in
rm entry developed slowly over time and hence produced a slow recovery in the unemployment
and vacancy rates.
11As an alternative calibration we restricted the value of p to stay constant at one and obtained that k = 1:13,
 = 0:078 and b = 0:93, conrming that changes in p are of second order importance for our results.
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4.3 The role of wage rigidity
Table 1 shows that to replicate the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies as observed during
the Great Recession, the calibration requires workers and rms to be essentially (Nash) bargain-
ing over the ow surplus, p   z, such that wages become nearly isolated from  and hence u.
Given that this form of wage rigidity is important to match the data, we now investigate how
much isolation wages require in our calibrated model in order to guarantee a downward sloping
transition path in the observed range of v and u values.
Figure 4 shows a collection of transition paths (dotted curves) generated by assuming dif-
ferent values of  2 [0; 0:019], but maintaining the rest of the parameters at the values shown
in Table 1. The higher transition path is obtained when  = 0, while the lowest transition path
is obtained when  = 0:019. For  > 0, each transition path starts at the origin and slopes
upwards until condition (18) is satised. At the implied inexion point the transition paths
become downward sloping. The solid line in Figure 4 trace the negative relation between the
dierent values of  and the inexion points of the transition paths. The dash line shows the
transition path generated by  = 0:003, the highest value of  that guarantees a downward
sloping transition path for all the observed values of the unemployment rate in our data, 4.7%
to 10%. The main message from this exercise is that, holding constant the rest of the parameter
values, our model requires wages to be quite strongly isolated from labour market tightness to
be consistent with the observed negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies.12
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Figure 4: Transition path for dierent values of 
The need for wages to be strongly isolated from  in order to replicate the data is consistent
with the nding of Marcusse (2016). In particular, this author analyses whether Nash bargaining
12The latter conclusion holds also in the presence of a larger dierence between p and z, as in Shimer (2005),
or with a lower value for workers' bargaining power,  = 0:5.
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over ow surplus allows the canonical search and matching model to better explain the observed
relationship between unemployment and vacancies in the US labour market relative to other
forms of wage determination: Nash bargaining over the match surplus, Hall and Milgrom's
(2008) sequential bargaining and Kalai and Smorodinski (1975) bargaining. Marcusse (2016)
consistently nds that Nash bargaining over the ow surplus improves the ability of the canonical
search and matching model in replicating the observed Beveridge curve under productivity (p)
and job destruction (s) shocks. Here we obtain a similar result. In the presence of job destruction
shocks, our model essentially requires workers and rms to Nash bargain over the ow surplus
in order to replicate the negative co-movement of v and u observed in the data.13
Given this result, one could question whether it is necessary to have an imperfect nancial
market in order to generate a downward sloping transition path in the presence of a  close
to zero. Note that our banking sector market-clearing assumption implies that the resource
constraint, equating aggregate banking output to total vacancy costs, must be satised at any
point in time. Equation (13) describes such a resource constraint under monopolistic competi-
tion. Irrespective of the market structure imposed on the banking sector, however, the resource
constraint will imply that aggregate banking output will be increasing in aggregate rm prof-
its and total vacancy cost will be increasing in unemployment. This generates a relationship
between v and u. As discussed in Section 3.2, the role of  is to inuence this relationship by
isolating the impact of u on wages and ultimately on rms' prots. Therefore, it is possible to
have a dierent market structure describing the banking sector and have a downward sloping
transition path when  is close to zero. In this paper we have assumed that the banking sector
is characterised by monopolistic competition because this is inline with a large body of work
that studies the observed degree of competition and concentration in the banking sector across
countries and time periods (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002, Kadir et al., 2015, and the reference
within). In turn, this structure allows us to study, in a parsimonious way, the rate at which our
economy recovers from unexpected shocks to the productivity of and the degree of competition
in the banking sector.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a simple general equilibrium matching model with an imper-
fect nancial market in the form a monopolistically competitive banking sector. The role of the
nancial sector is to fund job creation through the rms' prots. The critical element of our
model is the per period nancial resource constraint that determines the transitional dynamics
of vacancies and unemployment towards the steady state. The resource constraint adds a new
dimension to the canonical search and matching model. It makes it potentially consistent with
the fact that vacancies and unemployment adjust in opposite directions. We show that this
feature is readily obtained when wages are Nash bargained over the ow surplus, p   z. To
illustrate some of the quantitative implications of our model we calibrated to match the transi-
13Hall and Milgrom (2008) also calibrate the risk of breakdown during bargaining to be 0:0055% a day, suggesting
a need to strongly isolate wages from labour market tightness in order for their sequential bargaining model to
replicate the data.
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tional dynamics of the Great Recession and its aftermath. We nd that observed slow recovery
in the labour market was due to the lack of a signicant improvement in the eectiveness of the
banking sector in intermediating resources to fund job creation.
The model we developed is very parsimonious as our goal was to understand its main mech-
anism using analytical solutions, rather than numerical simulations. Clearly this comes at the
cost of presenting a perhaps too simplistic model. In particular, an important assumption made
here is that rms always required external funding to nance job creation. This assumption
might be reasonable among small rms, but it is somewhat more dicult to defend among big-
ger rms with large internal nancial reserves. Indeed it has been argued that some rms where
not short of funds but where just reluctant to spend some of it to nance investment and hence
job creation (see Monacelli et al., 2011). Adding this feature is an important extension to the
model developed here. However, we leave this extension for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Deriving equation (9)
The equation describing the evolution of J over time results from (5) with V = 0;
_J (t) = [r (t) + s] J (t)  (t):
With prots and the wage being substituted out from the prot equation (3) and wage equation
(7), i.e. with
(t) = p  w (t) = p  ((1  ) z +  [p+ (t)k])
= (1  ) (p  z)   (t) k (22)
we get
_J (t) = [r (t) + s] J (t)  (1  ) [p  z] + (t)k: (23)
Using (6) to compute _J (t) =   k
q((t))2
q0 ( (t)) _ (t) and substitute J (t) = kq((t)) into (23), we
nd (9).
A.2 The nancial sector
In this section we derive in more detail the nancial sector assuming that the banking sector is
described by a monopolistically competitive industry.
A.2.1 Monopolistic Competition
A service provider i maximizes
s (i; t) = p^ (i; t)x (i; t)  c (x (i; t)) :
Given the parameter , this implies mark-up pricing of
p^ (i; t) =
c0 (x (i; t))

: (24)
We now consider the costs of providing x (i; t). Given the technology (11), x (i; t) = by (i; t) 
; the cost to produce output x (i; t) is given by
c (x (i; t)) = y (i; t)
where y (i; t) is the input of the nal good whose price is normalized to one. The cost function
therefore reads
c (x (i; t)) =
+ x (i; t)
b
:
From (24), this implies that the price p^ (i; t) of one unit of service is given by the usual
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mark-up pricing rule
p^ (i; t) =
b 1

: (25)
Marginal costs to provide one unit of x (i; t) are given by the price of the output good (which
we normalized to one) divided by the productivity parameter b from (11). The mark-up 1= is
determined by the price-elasticity of demand for services x (i; t) implied by (10).
Prots can therefore be computed to amount to
s(i; t) = p^(i; t)x(i; t)  + x(i; t)
b
= p^(i; t)x(i; t)  p^(i; t)
b 1
+ x
b
;
where the last equality used (25). Hence,
s(i; t) = p^(i; t)x(i; t)  p^(i; t)  p^(i; t)x(i; t) = p^(i; t) [(1  )x(i; t)  ] :
As all rms use the same technology, the banking sector is symmetric and input per banking
service is given by
y (i; t) = y (t) =
(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
: (26)
The second equality shows that the input is given by total real prots of active rms divided by
the number of banking services. Note that the second equality is the rst crucial component of
our general equilibrium setup. Resources available at each point in time are given by real prots
 (t) per active rm times the number of active rms, which is given by the number of employed
workers 1  u (t). Equation (11) then implies that output per service provider is given by
x (t) = by (t)   = b(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  : (27)
Given symmetry and (27), we obtain (12) in the text.
The number of banks Monopolistic service providers i choose output x (t) such that prots
are maximized.14 This yields markup pricing (25) and implies ow prots per service provider
are given by s (t) = p^ (t) [(1  )x (t)  ]. After substituting output x from (27) in s (t) =
p^ (t) [(1  )x (t)  ], we obtain
s (t) = p^ (t)

(1  )

b
(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  

  

= p^ (t)

(1  ) b(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  (1  )  

= p^ (t)

(1  ) b(t) [1  u(t)]
n (t)
  

:
Given free-entry of banks, prots s (t) are driven to zero and we get (14).
14We suppress the provider index i as (27) has established symmetry.
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Deriving the resource constraint (15) Noting that b(t)[1 u(t)]n(t) =

1  and

1   = 1 ,
the resource constraint (13) can be re-written as
(1  ) b(t) [1  u(t)]

1= 
1   = k (t)u (t) : (28)
Using (3) and (7) to substitute out for prots and wages yields (22). Substituting this into (28)
yields
(1  ) b((1  ) (p  z)   (t) k) [1  u(t)]

1= 
1   = k (t)u (t),
(1  ) bk


(1  ) p  z
k
   (t)

[1  u(t)]
1=
 = (1  ) k

 (t)u (t),
(1  ) bk


(1  ) p  z
k
   (t)

[1  u(t)]  =

(1  ) k


 (t)u (t),
b

(1  ) k

1  
(1  ) p  z
k
   (t)

[1  u(t)]  =  (t)u (t),
b

(1  ) k

1  1  u(t)
u (t)
 =
 (t)
(1  ) p zk    (t)
:
The last expression is (15).
A.3 Existence of an interior steady state
We characterise conditions under which a unique interior steady state exists. To do so we
analyse how does the equilibrium path (15) behaves with respect to labour market tightness
after substituting out for unemployment using (16). Let the left-hand side of (15) by described
by
T1() =

[(1  )(p  z)  k]1=
: (29)
Similarly, substituting out for u using (16), the right-hand side of (15) can be described by
T2() = C
(s+ ())
s
h ()
s+ ()
i 1

; (30)
where
C =

(1  )
  1 

  1 

k
b
1
 (31)
describes a constant. Note that both T1 and T2 take the value of zero when  = 0.
Dierentiation of T1 and T2 with respect to  implies that both functions are increasing in
.
dT1
d
=
1

h(1  )(p  z) + k(1  )
[(1  )(p  z)  k] 1 
i
> 0;
dT2
d
=
C0()
s
 ()
s+ ()
 1

h
1 +
s
()
i
> 0:
26
Further dierentiation implies that d2T1=d
2 > 0, while
d2T2
d2
=
C
s
 ()
s+ ()
 1
 1
(())2
h
00()()(() + s) +
02s2
s+ ()
(1  )
i
:
The sign of d2T2=d
2 is then determined by the sign of the term in squared brackets. Note that
the rst term inside the squared brackets is negative (as the job nding rate is concave in ),
while the second term is positive. Given d2T2=d
2 < 0 for all , continuity of T1 and T2 imply
that in this case there exists a unique interior steady state equilibrium. If d2T2=d
2 > 0 or
non-monotone, we could also have multiple interior steady state equilibria or no equilibria at
all.
Given that in the quantitative section of the paper we focus on a Cobb-Douglas matching
function, M(u; v) = Auv1 , it is instructive to analyse the conditions for existence under
such a parametrisation. Noting that under this matching function the job nding rate and its
derivatives are given by: () = A1 , 0() = (1  )A  and 00() =  (1  )A (1+),
the term in the squared bracket in the above expression for d2T2=d
2 is given by
 A
2 2(1  )
s+A(1 )
h
s2(   (1  )) + A(1 )[s(1 + ) +A(1 )]
i
:
Inspection shows that +  1 provides a sucient (but not necessary) condition for d2T2=d2 <
0 and hence for existence of a unique interior steady state equilibrium.
A.4 The slope of the resource constraint
A.4.1 Preliminaries
Re-writing equation (15) in v   u space using an implicit formulation yields
G(v; u)  v   
(1  )k

(1  )b[(1  )(p  z)  k vu ][1  u]

 1

= 0: (32)
It follows from (32) that when all workers are unemployed, u = 1, there are no vacancies v = 0.
In this case no rm is producing and hence rms prots are zero implying that there are no
available funds to pay for vacancies.
Now consider the slope of G(v; u). Note that the resource constraint shows that aggregate
rms' prots and the number of vacancies must move in the same direction along the equilibrium
path. Aggregate rms' prots, however, depend positively on (i) the number of jobs lled and
negatively on (ii) the wage paid to workers; and both are inversely related to the unemploy-
ment rate. The slope of G(v; u) then depends on how responsive are wages to changes in the
unemployment rate. Employing the implicit function theorem, we obtain (see app. A.4.2)
dv
du
=
@n
@u
24" n 1
(1  )k

1
n
# 1
+
(1  )bk(1  u)
u
35 1 ;
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where the slope of the equilibrium path in Beveridge space is determined by
sign

@n
@u

= sign

@
@u
(1  u)  

; (33)
which in turn depends on how the unemployment rate aects rms ow prots via wages.
A.4.2 Total dierentiation of G(v; u)
Total dierentiation of G(v; u) implies dvdu =  
@G(v;u)
@u
@G(v;u)
@v
: Originally, equation (32) reads
G(v; u)  v   
(1  )k

(1  )b[(1  )(p  z)  k vu ][1  u]

 1

:
As from (14) and (22),
n =
(1  )b[(1  )(p  z)  k vu ][1  u]

; (34)
we can express it more compactly as
G(v; u) = v   
(1  ) kn
1
 = 0:
It follows that
@G(v; u)
@u
=  
"

(1  ) k
n
1

n
@n
@u
#
=  @n
@u
"
n
1

(1  ) k
1
n
#
@G(v; u)
@v
= 1  @n
@v
"
n
1

(1  ) k
1
n
#
:
Thus
dv
du
=  
 @n@u

n
1

(1 )k
1
n

1  @n@v

n
1

(1 )k
1
n
 = @n@u
n
1

(1 )k
1
n
 1
  @n@v
=
@n
@u
24" n 1
(1  ) k

1
n
# 1
  @n
@v
35 1 :
Note that from (34)
@n
@v
=  (1  ) bk (1  u)
u
;
so that
dv
du
=
@n
@u
24" n 1
(1  ) k

1
n
# 1
+
(1  ) bk (1  u)
u
35 :
28
A.4.3 The slope of G(v; u)
The resource constraint is falling by (33) i
dv
du
< 0, sign

@
@u
(1  u)  

< 0:
As @=@u = vk=u2 > 0 from (22), this holds i, using (22),
vk
u2
(1  u)   < 0, vk
u2
(1  u) <  , vk
u2
(1  u) < (1  ) (p  z)  k
,  v
u
1  u
u
< (1  ) p  z
k
   v
u
, v
u2
< (1  ) p  z
k
,  < 1  
v
p  z
k
u2:
A.5 Comparative statics for the slope of 	
We want to analyse how changes in  and b aect d=du, the slope of 	, as described in (20).
To do this let
	1 =  n[(1  )k(1  u) + n
1
 ];
	2 = k(1  )(1  u)[nu+ n
1
 (1  u)b]:
Changes in 
Noting that dn=d =  n=, we have that
@	1
@
=
n

h
(1  )k(1  u) + n 1
i
;
@	2
@
=  k(1  )(1  u)

h
nu + n
1
 (1  u)b
i
:
Since the
@[d=du]
@
=
1
	22

@	1
@
	2   @	2
@
	1

;
the sign of the change is determined by the expression in the squared bracket. Substituting the
corresponding expressions and some algebra establishes that
@[d=du]
@
=
1
	22
nk(1  )2(1  u)n 1


nu  (1  )k(1  u)2b :
Noting that n = (1  ) b [(1 )(p z) k][1 u] ; the above expression can be simplied to
@[d=du]
@
=
1
	22
nbk(1  )3(1  u)2n 1

[(1  )(p  z)u  k] :
The slope of 	 increases with  when (1   )(p   z)u > k: Since 	 is downward sloping,
an increase in its slope implies it becomes atter, which in turn imply that 	 shifts to the left
29
towards the origin.
Changes in b
In this case we have that dn=db = n=b and
@	1
@b
=   n
b
h
(1  )k(1  u) + n 1 (1 + )
i
;
@	2
@b
=
k(1  )(1  u)
b
h
nu + n
1
 (1  u)b(1 + )
i
:
Since the
@[d=du]
@b
=
1
	22

@	1
@b
	2   @	2
@b
	1

;
the sign of the derivative is determined by the expression in the squared bracket. Substituting
the corresponding expressions and some algebra establishes that
@[d=du]
@b
=   1
	22
nk(1  )(1  u)n 1
b

nu  (1  )k(1  u)2b ;
where the term in squared brackets is the same as in the case of changes in . Using the
expression for n we obtain that
@[d=du]
@b
=   1
	22
nk(1  )2(1  u)2n 1

[(1  )(p  z)u  k] :
The slope of 	 decreases with b when (1  )(p  z)u > k. Since 	 is downward sloping, a
decrease in its slope implies it becomes stepper, which in turn imply that 	 shifts to the right
away from the origin.
Changes in 
In this case we have that dn=d =  n=(1  ) and that
@(n
1
 )
@
=   n
1

2(1  ) [(1  )ln(n) + ] :
These expressions together imply
@	1
@
= 2nk(1  u) + n
1

2(1  ) [(1 + n) + (1  )ln(n)] ;
@	2
@
=  2nuk(1  u)  k(1  u)
2n
1
 b
2
[(1 + ) + (1  )ln(n)] :
Since the
@[d=du]
@
=
1
	22

@	1
@
	2   @	2
@
	1

;
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once again the sign of the change is determined by the expression in the squared bracket. Substi-
tuting the corresponding expressions and some algebra establishes that the sign of @[d=du]=@
equals the sign of
u[n2+(1 )ln(n)] 
h
bk(1 u)2(1 )2(+ln(n))+u+n 1  (1 u)b(n 1)[+(1 )ln(n)]
i
:
Consider the sign of @[d=du]=@ as  ! 1. Since in this limit n ! 0, we nd that
@[d=du]=@ < 0 when b()   s > 0. On the other hand, when  ! 0, we nd that in
this limit @[d=du]=@ < 0 when n > 1. In both case a decrease in the slope of 	 implies it
becomes stepper, which in turn imply that 	 shifts to the right away from the origin.
A.6 Calibration
To calibrate the parameters x = fk; z; ; ; ; g, we minimise the squared relative distance
between the observed vacancy rates and the ones implied by our transition path taking the
observed unemployment rates as given. That is, we choose
x = argmin
X
t

vt   v^(x;ut)
vt
2
; (35)
where v^(x;ut) denotes the vacancy rate that solves (15) given the vector of parameters x and the
observed unemployment rate ut. The minimisation problem is subject to the following equality
constraints:
(1  )p  z
k
q()  s  r   () = 0
v   v^(x;u) = 0
0:5w   z = 0
0:036w   vk = 0
In practice, we use the fmincon function from the Optimization Toolbox (Version 7.2) in
Matlab (Version 8.5.0.197613 (R2015a)) designed to nd the minimum of a function f(x) with
linear and nonlinear inequality and equality constraints. Note that at every evaluation of the
objective function, we also have to solve for the series of vacancy rates v^(x;u). Given a guess for
the parameter vector x and the observed unemployment rates, we can numerically solve equation
(15) to obtain the series of vacancy rates implied by our model. In practice, we use the lsqnonlin
function from the Optimization Toolbox - a nonlinear least square solver - to perform this step
and check that the value of the objective function is close to 0. The advantage of the non-linear
least square solver compared to Matlab's built-in solver for nonlinear systems, fsolve, is that
we can impose a non-negativity constraint ensuring the stability of the optimisation procedure.
A.7 The Impact of the Financial Crises: Time series
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Figure 5: Unemployment exit rate
Notes: This gure shows the monthly unemployment exit rate for the US. The exit
rate was calculated following footnote (8) using BLS data on the seasonal adjusted
number of unemployed and unemployed with durations less than 5 weeks. The Great
Recession is the period between the two dashed lines.
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Figure 6: Job destruction rate
Notes: This gure shows the monthly employment exit rate for the US. The exit
rate was calculated following footnote (8) using BLS data on the seasonal adjusted
number of employed and unemployed with durations less than 5 weeks. The Great
Recession is the period between the two dashed lines.
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Figure 7: Unemployment and vacancy dynamics
Notes: This gure shows the monthly unemployment and vacancy rate for the US.
The data is taken from the BLS and the JOLTS. Rates are calculated by dividing the
number of vacancies and unemployed by the sum of the employed and unemployed
in a given month. The Great Recession is the period between the two dashed lines.
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Figure 8: Money multiplier
Notes: This gure shows the evolution of the M1 money multiplier over
time. The data is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MULT). The Great Recession is the pe-
riod between the two dashed lines.
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